| H1 | (a) Higher the degree of completeness in franchise contracts, the behavior monitoring on franchisees decrease (–). | × |
| (b) Higher the degree of completeness in franchise contracts, output monitoring on franchisees decrease (–). | ○ |
| H2 | (a) Higher the one-sidedness of franchise contract, there is an increase (+) in behavior monitoring. | ○ |
| (b) Higher the one-sidedness of franchise contract, there is an increase (+) in output monitoring. | × |
| H3 | (a) The stronger the behavior monitoring by the franchisor, franchisee’s compliance decreases (–). | × |
| (b) The stronger the behavior monitoring by the franchisor, franchisee’s opportunistic behavior increases (+). | × |
| H4 | (a) The stronger the behavior monitoring by the franchisor, the franchisee’s compliance increases (+). | × |
| (b) The stronger the behavior monitoring by the franchisor, the franchisee’s opportunistic behavior decreases (–). | × |
| H5 | (a) The higher the degree in which behavior and output monitoring are concurrently run, the franchise store’s compliance increases (+). | ○ |
| (b) The higher the degree in which behavior and output monitoring are concurrently run, the franchise store’s opportunistic behavior decreases (–). | ○ |
| H6 | (a) In cases where the Goal Incongruity between the franchisor and the franchisee is great, the negative (–) effect of franchisor behavior monitoring increases (+). | ○ |
| (b) In cases where the Goal Incongruity between the franchisor and the franchisee is great, the positive (+) effect of franchisor output monitoring decreases (–). | ○ |
| H7 | (a) In cases where the Goal Incongruity between the franchisor and the franchisee is great, the positive (+) effect of franchisor behavior monitoring on opportunistic behavior increases (+). | ○ |
| (b) In cases where the Goal Incongruity between the franchisor and the franchisee is great, the negative (–) effect of franchisor output monitoring on opportunistic behavior decreases (–). | ○ |