비용절감능력이 상이한 기업들의 유통경로구조 전략

본 논문은 제품원가절감능력이 상이한 두 생산자가 경쟁할 때 최적의 유통경로구조 균형 해를 분 석함으로써 비용절감능력 측면에서 비교우위를 갖는 생산자는 수직적으로 통합된 유통경로를 선호하 게 되고, 이와 달리 비용절감능력이 상대적으로 낮은 생산자에게는 분권화된 유통경로가 최선의 대안 이 되는 조건을 제시하였다. 이러한 결과는 비용절감능력의 차이가 없는 대칭적인 생산자들의 경쟁을 조사함으로써 항상 동일한 유통경로구조들로 구성된 균형 해를 제시한 기존 선행연구의 결과와는 달 리 상이한 유통경로구조가 경쟁적인 생산자들에 의해 선택되어 시장 내에서 균형 해로 존재할 수 있 음을 의미한다. 또한 본 연구는 비용절감을 위한 연구개발투자수준이 내생적인 의사결정변수인 경우 와 외생적인 변수인 경우를 비교분석함으로써 최적의 유통전략과 관련하여 상이한 결과가 도출됨을 보여주었다. 전자의 경우 제품들 간 대체성이 높지 않고 생산자들 간 비용절감능력의 차이가 크게 되 면 위에서 언급된 상이한 유통경로구조들로 구성된 균형 해가 존재한다. 반면 후자로부터는 제품들 간 대체성과 비용절감능력의 차이와 상관없이 상이한 유통경로구조들로 구성된 균형 해가 도출되지 않는다. 본 연구는 기존 선행연구를 통해 살펴볼 수 없었던 이러한 새로운 결과들은 통해 경영자에게 제시하는 시사점을 논의하였다.

Channel structure decisions (a vertically integrated channel vs. a decentralized channel) are often strategically important for many manufacturers' success in a competitive market. There is a long list of marketing literature on various issues related to the channel structure decisions. For instance, many previous researchers have investigated theoretically the problem of channel coordination for mitigating market inefficiency caused by "double marginalization problem" for the decentralized channel (e.g., Jeuland and Shugan 1983; Ingene and Parry 1995). In contrast, other studies such as McGuire and Staelin(1983) found that the decentralized channel comes to be channel structure equilibrium when manufacturers' products are highly substitutable. Gupta and Loulou(1998) has made useful extensions to the literature by incorporating the manufacturer's investment decision in process innovation into its channel structure decisions. All these streams of literature examine channel design problems assuming that competing manufacturers have the same cost efficiency. Therefore, despite their important contributions to academia as well as practice, the results of those prior studies cannot provide useful messages for channel structure decisions in the market where less efficient manufacturers compete against highly cost-efficient ones.

In this study we extend the literature by looking into an optimal channel design strategy for competing manufacturers which are asymmetric in terms of their capability to reduce production costs. We assume that one manufacturer is able to reduce a unit production cost more efficiently than the other competing manufacturer. Under the assumption, we find that the changes in channel structure have different effects depending on whether they occur in the more efficient channel or in the less efficient channel. Different from the findings of McGuire and Staelin(1983), our results suggest that, even if the manufacturers' products are not highly substitutable, the less efficient manufacturer finds it more profitable to choose the decentralized channel rather than the integrated channel as the gap between the cost reduction capabilities of two manufacturers become large, whereas the vertically integrated channel is always the better choice for the more efficient one regardless of the gap in their capabilities. Interestingly, this result is obtained when the manufacturer's decision on the level of the R&D investment determining the size of cost reduction is endogenous. However, we find that when the level of the R&D investment is given exogenously, the results are consistent with the previous studies. That is, even under big cost difference between two manufacturers, both manufacturers always choose the same type of channel structure and, thus, the channel structure equilibrium can be either integration or decentralization in both channels (or both).